The transportation industry waits with bated breath now that the United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the case of Montgomery v. Caribe II. Montgomery may have long-lasting ripple effects throughout the industry. However, other appellate court decisions have been issued recently that still impact the industry in meaningful ways. Here is a quick analysis of three decisions, including a short discussion of the issues at play in Montgomery.
Werner Enterprises v. Blake, 2025 Tex. LEXIS 889 (Tex. Sept. 26, 2025)
This case needs no introduction. The Werner case stems from a 2014 accident during a winter storm in which the plaintiffs’ vehicle lost control on one side of a divided interstate, crossed the median, and struck a Werner truck operating within its own lane of travel. In this tragic accident, a seven-year-old child died and a twelve-year-old was left paralyzed.
Plaintiffs argued that Werner’s driver ignored the icy conditions and should not have been on the road in the icy conditions. Werner showed that the driver was operating below the speed limit in the proper lane of traffic. Not only were Werner and its driver not negligent, but even if they were, there negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident. They argued that the proximate cause of the accident was the driver of the plaintiffs’ pickup truck losing control.
In a 2018 trial in Houston, Texas, a jury returned an $89.7 million verdict after a six-week trial. The verdict received national attention. After the Court of Appeals in Texas upheld the verdict, it received still more national attention. On June 27, 2025, the Texas Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower courts. The Court focused primarily on the issue of proximate cause, finding that “proximate cause requires, among other things, proof that the defendant’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing the injury.” Werner Enters., Inc. v. Blake, 2025 Tex. LEXIS 585, *3. The Supreme Court stressed that “even if the defendant’s negligence is part of the causal chain of events that led to the injury, the defendant is not liable if his involvement was a mere ‘happenstance of place and time.’” Id.
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This case is important for several reasons. First, it demonstrated the possibility, however, remote, that an appellate court has the ability to correct the errors of a lower court in failing to dismiss a case. Either of the lower courts involved in the Werner case should have looked at the circumstances of the accident and applied principles of proximate cause and reasonable foreseeability to reach the conclusion that no matter how tragic the circumstances in the accident, the actions of Werner and its driver were not proximate cause.
Second, this decision should force all lawyers and their clients to go back to the basics of tort law. Just because an accident happens, as they often do in trucking, does not mean that the trucking company is automatically at fault. The plaintiff must still prove duty, breach, causation, and damages.
Finally, given the national notoriety of the case, even though it is a Texas Supreme Court decision interpreting Texas law, the case could have wider application on the general tort principle of proximate cause. Many states have similar rules and cases interpreting the proximate cause requirement. The Werner case could be a modern-day example of Palsgraf and other law school torts class cases that provide the foundation for concepts of proximate cause and reasonable foreseeability.
Montgomery v. Caribe II, Case No. 24-1238, United States Supreme Court
On October 3, 2025, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case of Montgomery v. Caribe II, Case No. 24-1238 with the hopeful intent of settling a circuit split on the application of preemption. In Montgomery, the injured plaintiff is challenging the Seventh Circuit’s ruling that his injury claims against freight broker C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. are preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Act of 1994 (FAAAA). On its face, the FAAAA provides that:
a State, political subdivision of a State, or political authority of 2 or more States may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier. . . or any motor private carrier, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of property.
49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1).
The Act does contain a safety exception within Section 14501(c)(2)(A), saving from preemption laws within a state’s “safety regulatory authority … with respect to motor vehicles.” At issue in Montgomery will be whether the safety exception applies, thus saving the plaintiff’s negligent hiring and selection claims against the freight broker, C.H. Robinson, from preemption.
Currently, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits find that the FAAAA shields freight brokers from such independent negligence claims as those raised in Montgomery. Conversely, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits take a broader view of the safety exception, allowing injured plaintiffs to bring these claims against freight brokers.
While certiorari was only granted on October 3, 2025, it remains to be seen when the Court will issue a ruling. Generally speaking, if the case is argued early in the 2026 terms, a ruling could come as early as May or June of 2026.
Cox v. Total Quality Logistics, Inc., 142 F.4th 847 (6th Cir., July 8 2025)
In Cox, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals sided with the Ninth Circuit in the application of the so-called safety exception within Section 14501(c)(2)(A). Plaintiff’s wife was killed in a motor vehicle accident involving a motor carrier, Golden Transit. Plaintiff sued the freight broker, TQL, with two primary allegations: (1) TQL was negligent in hiring and selecting the motor carrier, Golden Transit; and (2) TQL operated as a motor carrier with respect to the shipment at issue and it was independently negligent as a motor carrier.
The district court dismissed the complaint in full, finding that the claims against TQL were preempted and did not fall within the safety exception. The Sixth Circuit agreed that the state law claim negligent hiring claim against TQL fell within the preemption outlined by Section 14501(c)(1). Where the Sixth Circuit took it a step further, like the Ninth Circuit, was in finding that state-law negligence actions against a freight broker fell within the “safety regulatory authority of a state with respect to motor vehicles.” The Court found that the connection between the state common law and motor vehicles was sufficient for the safety exception to apply. The connection, however tenuous, between the regulated entity (TQL) and the motor vehicle (the truck owned by Golden Transit) was not the important part of the analysis.
TQL has petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. That petition remains pending. Now that the Court has granted certiorari in Montgomery, it could do the same in Cox and hear both cases as companion cases. Or it could allow Cox to languish and instead use Montgomery to resolve the split. Either way, FAAAA preemption and the application of the Act’s safety exception take center stage with the Supreme Court in the coming months.
Written by Blair Cash
Blair is an attorney with Moseley Marcinak Law Group, focusing on commercial vehicle and motor carrier liability. He represents clients in all phases of litigation in Georgia’s state and federal courts, including complex accident and wrongful death cases. He regularly publishes and presents on topics such as commercial vehicle and motor carrier liability, claims handling, and general advice to the transportation industry. Blair has been named a Rising Star® in Georgia from 2018–2024, an honor awarded to only 2.5% of attorneys statewide.